Line: 1 to 1 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PROCEDURES FOR GLIDEINWMS CRAB SERVER DURING THE CMS SECURITY CHALLENGE SSC6 | ||||||||
Line: 27 to 27 | ||||||||
condor_hold uscmsxxx | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | As root, block the local userid in the /etc/passwd file on all submitter nodes by appending something to the userid like uscmsxxxBLOCKED. This will help in cleanup later. Effectively this will block any further submissions by denying the ability of the compromised DN to use gridftp on the server. | |||||||
> > | As root, block the local userid in the /etc/passwd file on all submitter nodes by appending something to the userid like uscmsxxxBLOCKED. This will help in cleanup later. Effectively this will block any further submissions by denying the ability of the compromised DN to use gridftp or glexec on the server. | |||||||
Collecting Information | ||||||||
Line: 66 to 66 | ||||||||
... | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Pilot startd names are also available in the EventLog. From this information it should be possible to determine which other jobs ran on the same pilots that may have been compromised, if any. | |||||||
> > | Pilot startd names are also available in the EventLog. From this information it should be possible to determine which other jobs ran on the same pilots that may have been compromised, if any. The command condor_userlog -attr can query any attribute avaialble in the EventLog. The ClassAd? names are the same names as in condor_q and condor_history. | |||||||
IP address from which jobs were submitted are more difficult to determine. In principle, this info is in two logs in $PRODAGENT_WORKDIR/CommandManager
|
Line: 1 to 1 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PROCEDURES FOR GLIDEINWMS CRAB SERVER DURING THE CMS SECURITY CHALLENGE SSC6 | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Banning Users | |||||||
> > | Banning Users | |||||||
During the CMS Security Challenge, glideinWMS CRAB SERVER operators may be asked to ban a particular DN and provide certain information about the "attack". In particular, given a particular user DN, admins may be asked to take action to: | ||||||||
Line: 17 to 17 | ||||||||
Detailed ProceduresThe procedure for banning a user starts with mapping the certificate DN to a local userid on the UCSD CRAB Servers. This can be done by looking at the list of mappings. The command condor_q can also give you the same information, but only if the user still has jobs pending or running. | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | The local UNIX userid typically has the form uscmsxxx. | |||||||
> > | The local UNIX userid typically has the form uscmsxxx. However, if a priority user's DN is compromised then it will have the form cmspaxxx. | |||||||
condor_q -format '%s ' Owner -format '%s\n' x509userproxysubject | sort | uniq -c | ||||||||
Line: 27 to 27 | ||||||||
condor_hold uscmsxxx | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Remove the local userid from the /etc/passwd file on all submitter nodes. This will block any further submissions. | |||||||
> > | As root, block the local userid in the /etc/passwd file on all submitter nodes by appending something to the userid like uscmsxxxBLOCKED. This will help in cleanup later. Effectively this will block any further submissions by denying the ability of the compromised DN to use gridftp on the server. | |||||||
Collecting Information | ||||||||
Line: 38 to 38 | ||||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Information on which sites jobs ran at is (or soon will be) in the condor logs on the submission nodes in the file /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog. Eventually we will have a tool to parse this log, but the information is available in terms of condor Cluster ID (the same information you get from condor_q or condor_history) and JOB_Site: | |||||||
> > | Information on which sites jobs ran at is in the condor logs on the submission nodes in the file /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog. The log contains event information in terms of condor cluster IDs, GLIDEIN_Site, time stamps etc. We now have a tool to parse this log, courtesy of I. Sfiligoi. To use the tool (currently only installed on submit-4): | |||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | letts@submit-4 /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log$ tail -100 /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog |egrep '^Cluster|^JOB_Site' Cluster = 31675 JOB_Site = "CERN" Cluster = 31675 JOB_Site = "CERN" Cluster = 31607 JOB_Site = "JINR" | |||||||
> > | source /opt/condor_igor_3214/condor.sh
condor_userlog -rotated -fullname -attr Owner,JOB_GLIDEIN_Site /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog
Job Host Start Time Evict Time Wall Time Good Time CPU Usage
31805.0 uscms3649,IFCA 8/28 20:43 8/28 20:44 0+00:01 0+00:01 0+00:00
31142.51 uscms4150,Louvain 8/28 20:29 8/28 23:01 0+02:32 0+00:00 0+00:00
31142.12 uscms4150,Louvain 8/28 20:59 8/28 23:01 0+02:02 0+00:00 0+00:00
31142.46 uscms4150,Louvain 8/28 20:58 8/28 23:02 0+02:03 0+00:00 0+00:00
31142.27 uscms4150,Louvain 8/28 21:01 8/28 23:02 0+02:01 0+00:00 0+00:00
31142.13 uscms4150,Louvain 8/28 21:02 8/28 23:02 0+02:00 0+00:00 0+00:00
...
To query a particular user:
condor_userlog -rotated -const 'Owner=="uscms2330"' -fullname -attr Owner,JOB_GLIDEIN_Site /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog Job Host Start Time Evict Time Wall Time Good Time CPU Usage 31869.4 uscms2330,IFCA 8/29 00:20 8/29 00:21 0+00:01 0+00:01 0+00:00 31869.8 uscms2330,IFCA 8/29 00:20 8/29 00:21 0+00:01 0+00:01 0+00:00 31869.7 uscms2330,IFCA 8/29 00:20 8/29 00:21 0+00:01 0+00:01 0+00:00 31869.5 uscms2330,IFCA 8/29 00:20 8/29 00:21 0+00:01 0+00:01 0+00:00 31869.6 uscms2330,IFCA 8/29 00:20 8/29 00:21 0+00:01 0+00:01 0+00:00 ... | |||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Pilot names are also available in the EventLog. From this information it should be possible to determine which other jobs ran on the same pilots that may have been compromised, if any. | |||||||
> > | Pilot startd names are also available in the EventLog. From this information it should be possible to determine which other jobs ran on the same pilots that may have been compromised, if any. | |||||||
IP address from which jobs were submitted are more difficult to determine. In principle, this info is in two logs in $PRODAGENT_WORKDIR/CommandManager
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | However, there is no guaranteed relationship. FrontendLog is written by $CRABSERVER_ROOT/src/python/CommandManager/server_side/server2.c. S.B. looked a bit if it was obvious how to change to add the task name to the IP connection message (user's DN does not seem there, but task name would do), but it looks too complicted for understanding in a short time and we should not make very extensive changes to CRAB2 at this time. | |||||||
> > | However, there is no guaranteed relationship. FrontendLog is written by $CRABSERVER_ROOT/src/python/CommandManager/server_side/server2.c. S. Belforte looked a bit if it was obvious how to change to add the task name to the IP connection message (user's DN does not seem there, but task name would do), but it looks too complicted for understanding in a short time and we should not make very extensive changes to CRAB2 at this time. | |||||||
Other actions based on information collected: | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Compromised Pilot Certificate | |||||||
> > | Compromised Pilot Certificate | |||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | The compromise of a pilot certificate is much more complicated than the case of a compromised user certificate, since there are only O(10) pilot certificates which are cycled round-robin to run glideinWMS pilots. User jobs will then connect to startd's run by these pilots for executing the user jobs. If a pilot certificate is compromised, then potentially every site and every user of glideinWMS for CMS analysis during the time since the compromise can be affected. | |||||||
> > | The compromise of a pilot certificate is much more complicated than the case of a compromised user certificate, since there are only O(10) pilot certificates which are cycled round-robin to run glideinWMS pilots. User jobs will then connect to startd's run by these pilots for executing the user jobs. If a pilot certificate is compromised, then potentially every site and every user of glideinWMS for CMS analysis during the time since the compromise can be affected. The time and effort to determine which, if any, proxies were not compromised might be prohibitive. In this case, it may be more efficient to shut down the entire system, clean up, and restart with un-compromised proxies. However, for the purposes of SSC6, we will not halt glidein CRAB operations or kill pilots. Simply make sure that such information that would be needed to carry out such an operation is obtainable and communication lines are working. | |||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | How do you know a pilot proxy was compromised? GOOD QUESTION! | |||||||
> > | How do you know a pilot proxy was compromised? While this is a good question, for the purposes of SCC6 we will simply be told. | |||||||
Initial ActionsIf a glideinWMS pilot DN is compromised, admins will have to: | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Line: 95 to 109 | ||||||||
Remove the compromised proxy from the list and replace it with another that is not being used already in this frontend or in any other running frontend on the machine. | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Other certificates can be found in ~/.globus. | |||||||
> > | Other certificates can be found in ~/.globus (but they are not yet registed with the CMS VO). | |||||||
Reconfigure the frontend:
./frontend_startup reconfig ../instance_v5_4.cfg/frontend.xml | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | To remove all running and queued pilots with a particular DN, it is necessary to contact the Factory Operators (osg-gfactory-support@physics.ucsd.edu). Also ask them for a history of pilots that ran at sites with that DN since the time of the incident (pilot name of the form "glidein_15640@node20-9.wn.iihe.ac.be", site). | |||||||
> > | To remove all running and queued pilots with a particular DN, it is necessary to contact the Factory Operators (osg-gfactory-support@physics.ucsd.edu). | |||||||
Collecting Information
| ||||||||
Line: 110 to 124 | ||||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Given the large number of pilots running at any given time O(10000) and the small number of proxies O(10), every site and every user who ran a job in the glideinWMS analysis system since the time of the compromise of a pilot certificate will have been affected. To make this point, look at every site where pilots are currently running using one certificate: | |||||||
> > | Given the large number of pilots running at any given time O(10000) and the small number of proxies O(10), every site and every user who ran a job in the glideinWMS analysis system since the time of the compromise of a pilot certificate may have been affected. To make this point, look at every site where pilots are currently running using one certificate: | |||||||
letts@submit-4 ~$ condor_status -const '(GLIDEIN_X509_GRIDMAP_DNS=?="/DC=org/DC=doegrids/OU=Services/CN=glidein-collector.t2.ucsd.edu,/DC=org/DC=doegrids/OU=Services/CN=glidein-frontend.t2.ucsd.edu,/DC=org/DC=doegrids/OU=Services/CN=uscmspilot05/glidein-1.t2.ucsd.edu")' -l | grep ^GLIDEIN_CMSSite | sort | uniq -c 20 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T1_CH_CERN" | ||||||||
Line: 147 to 161 | ||||||||
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | This is 33 out of 39 sites running glideins at this time. To get detailed information about pilot history, ask Factory Ops for a history of pilots that ran at sites with that DN since the time of the incident (pilot name of the form "glidein_15640@node20-9.wn.iihe.ac.be", site). Then you can cross-reference the list of pilots against the condor_history (potentially a lot of work). | |||||||
> > | This is 33 out of 39 sites running glideins at this time. Over the course of a few hours, this would quickly encompass all sites. Therefore, it is likely that every site running a glidein since the time of the compromise has been affected. | |||||||
Other Actions | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
General Observation | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Note that if a compromise is thought to spread from pilot to user DN and vice-versa, the entire system could be considered compromised on short order, given that user tasks have of order O(1000) jobs and there are only 10 pilot proxies. The probability that any task of 1000 jobs that have already run or started avoided a particular pilot proxy is very very small (1.7 x 10^-46).
To consider (Igor, Stefano, Lola, James):
| |||||||
> > | Note that if a compromise is thought to spread from pilot to user DN and vice-versa, the entire system could be considered compromised on short order, given that user tasks have of order O(1000) jobs and there are only 10 pilot proxies. The probability that any task of 1000 jobs that have already run or started have avoided using pilot with a particular pilot proxy is very very small (1.7 x 10^-46). Therefore, in case of this kind of attack, there may be nothing to do other than holding all user jobs, removing all running and queued pilots, banning the compromised pilot certificates as above, and starting over. (What about compromised user proxies? When would it be safe to let user jobs run again?) | |||||||
Deleted: | ||||||||
< < | -- JamesLetts - 2012/08/27 | |||||||
\ No newline at end of file | ||||||||
Added: | ||||||||
> > | -- JamesLetts - 2012/08/29 |
Line: 1 to 1 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PROCEDURES FOR GLIDEINWMS CRAB SERVER DURING THE CMS SECURITY CHALLENGE SSC6 | ||||||||
Line: 27 to 27 | ||||||||
condor_hold uscmsxxx | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Remove the local userid from the /etc/passwd file on all submitter nodes. This will block any further submissions. | |||||||
> > | Remove the local userid from the /etc/passwd file on all submitter nodes. This will block any further submissions. | |||||||
Collecting InformationInformation an operator should collect: | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Line: 47 to 48 | ||||||||
Cluster = 31607 JOB_Site = "JINR" | ||||||||
Added: | ||||||||
> > | Pilot names are also available in the EventLog. From this information it should be possible to determine which other jobs ran on the same pilots that may have been compromised, if any. | |||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | IP address from which jobs were submitted? - STEFANO | |||||||
> > | IP address from which jobs were submitted are more difficult to determine. In principle, this info is in two logs in $PRODAGENT_WORKDIR/CommandManager
| |||||||
Other actions based on information collected:
| ||||||||
Line: 94 to 102 | ||||||||
./frontend_startup reconfig ../instance_v5_4.cfg/frontend.xml | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | how to kill all pilots with DN=X | |||||||
> > | To remove all running and queued pilots with a particular DN, it is necessary to contact the Factory Operators (osg-gfactory-support@physics.ucsd.edu). Also ask them for a history of pilots that ran at sites with that DN since the time of the incident (pilot name of the form "glidein_15640@node20-9.wn.iihe.ac.be", site). | |||||||
Collecting Information | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Line: 140 to 149 | ||||||||
This is 33 out of 39 sites running glideins at this time. | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | WRITE HOW TO GET THIS LIST OF SITES, USERS. | |||||||
> > | To get detailed information about pilot history, ask Factory Ops for a history of pilots that ran at sites with that DN since the time of the incident (pilot name of the form "glidein_15640@node20-9.wn.iihe.ac.be", site). Then you can cross-reference the list of pilots against the condor_history (potentially a lot of work). | |||||||
Other Actions
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Action Items | |||||||
> > | General ObservationNote that if a compromise is thought to spread from pilot to user DN and vice-versa, the entire system could be considered compromised on short order, given that user tasks have of order O(1000) jobs and there are only 10 pilot proxies. The probability that any task of 1000 jobs that have already run or started avoided a particular pilot proxy is very very small (1.7 x 10^-46).To consider (Igor, Stefano, Lola, James): | |||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
-- JamesLetts - 2012/08/27 \ No newline at end of file |
Line: 1 to 1 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PROCEDURES FOR GLIDEINWMS CRAB SERVER DURING THE CMS SECURITY CHALLENGE SSC6 | ||||||||
Line: 16 to 16 | ||||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | The procedure for banning a user starts with mapping the certificate DN to a local userid on the UCSD CRAB SERVERS. This can be done by looking at the list of mappings. The command condor_q can also give you the same information, but only if the user still has jobs pending or running. | |||||||
> > | The procedure for banning a user starts with mapping the certificate DN to a local userid on the UCSD CRAB Servers. This can be done by looking at the list of mappings. The command condor_q can also give you the same information, but only if the user still has jobs pending or running. The local UNIX userid typically has the form uscmsxxx. | |||||||
condor_q -format '%s ' Owner -format '%s\n' x509userproxysubject | sort | uniq -c | ||||||||
Deleted: | ||||||||
< < | The local UNIX userid typically has the form uscmsxxx. | |||||||
On each of the submitter nodes (glidein-2.t2.ucsd.edu, submit-[1-4].t2.ucsd.edu), HOLD any pending or running jobs from this user by running:
condor_hold uscmsxxx | ||||||||
Line: 34 to 33 | ||||||||
Information an operator should collect:
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Information on which sites jobs ran at is (or soon will be) in the condor logs on the submission nodes in the file /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog. | |||||||
> > | Information on which sites jobs ran at is (or soon will be) in the condor logs on the submission nodes in the file /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog. Eventually we will have a tool to parse this log, but the information is available in terms of condor Cluster ID (the same information you get from condor_q or condor_history) and JOB_Site:
letts@submit-4 /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log$ tail -100 /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog |egrep '^Cluster|^JOB_Site' Cluster = 31675 JOB_Site = "CERN" Cluster = 31675 JOB_Site = "CERN" Cluster = 31607 JOB_Site = "JINR"IP address from which jobs were submitted? - STEFANO | |||||||
Other actions based on information collected:
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Compromised Pilot Certificate | ||||||||
Line: 135 to 145 | ||||||||
Other Actions
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Action Items
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
-- JamesLetts - 2012/08/27 |
Line: 1 to 1 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PROCEDURES FOR GLIDEINWMS CRAB SERVER DURING THE CMS SECURITY CHALLENGE SSC6 | ||||||||
Line: 16 to 16 | ||||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | The procedure for banning a user starts with mapping the certificate DN to a local userid on the UCSD CRAB SERVERS. This can be done by looking at the list of mappings. The local UNIX userid typically has the form uscmsxxx. | |||||||
> > | The procedure for banning a user starts with mapping the certificate DN to a local userid on the UCSD CRAB SERVERS. This can be done by looking at the list of mappings. The command condor_q can also give you the same information, but only if the user still has jobs pending or running.
condor_q -format '%s ' Owner -format '%s\n' x509userproxysubject | sort | uniq -cThe local UNIX userid typically has the form uscmsxxx. | |||||||
On each of the submitter nodes (glidein-2.t2.ucsd.edu, submit-[1-4].t2.ucsd.edu), HOLD any pending or running jobs from this user by running: | ||||||||
Line: 33 to 38 | ||||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < | Information on which sites jobs ran at is (or soon will be) in the condor logs on the submission nodes. NEED DETAILS, AND TO IMPLEMENT IGOR'S CONFIG MODIFICATIONS | |||||||
> > | Information on which sites jobs ran at is (or soon will be) in the condor logs on the submission nodes in the file /opt/glidecondor/condor_local/log/EventLog. | |||||||
Other actions based on information collected:
| ||||||||
Line: 43 to 48 | ||||||||
The compromise of a pilot certificate is much more complicated than the case of a compromised user certificate, since there are only O(10) pilot certificates which are cycled round-robin to run glideinWMS pilots. User jobs will then connect to startd's run by these pilots for executing the user jobs. If a pilot certificate is compromised, then potentially every site and every user of glideinWMS for CMS analysis during the time since the compromise can be affected. | ||||||||
Added: | ||||||||
> > | How do you know a pilot proxy was compromised? GOOD QUESTION! | |||||||
Initial ActionsIf a glideinWMS pilot DN is compromised, admins will have to: | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
Detailed Procedures | ||||||||
Line: 130 to 139 | ||||||||
Action Items | ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
| ||||||||
Changed: | ||||||||
< < |
| |||||||
> > |
| |||||||
-- JamesLetts - 2012/08/27 |
Line: 1 to 1 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Added: | ||||||||
> > |
PROCEDURES FOR GLIDEINWMS CRAB SERVER DURING THE CMS SECURITY CHALLENGE SSC6Banning UsersDuring the CMS Security Challenge, glideinWMS CRAB SERVER operators may be asked to ban a particular DN and provide certain information about the "attack". In particular, given a particular user DN, admins may be asked to take action to:Initial Actions
Detailed ProceduresThe procedure for banning a user starts with mapping the certificate DN to a local userid on the UCSD CRAB SERVERS. This can be done by looking at the list of mappings. The local UNIX userid typically has the form uscmsxxx. On each of the submitter nodes (glidein-2.t2.ucsd.edu, submit-[1-4].t2.ucsd.edu), HOLD any pending or running jobs from this user by running:condor_hold uscmsxxxRemove the local userid from the /etc/passwd file on all submitter nodes. This will block any further submissions. Collecting InformationInformation an operator should collect:
Detailed ProceduresInformation on which sites jobs ran at is (or soon will be) in the condor logs on the submission nodes. NEED DETAILS, AND TO IMPLEMENT IGOR'S CONFIG MODIFICATIONSOther actions based on information collected:
Compromised Pilot CertificateThe compromise of a pilot certificate is much more complicated than the case of a compromised user certificate, since there are only O(10) pilot certificates which are cycled round-robin to run glideinWMS pilots. User jobs will then connect to startd's run by these pilots for executing the user jobs. If a pilot certificate is compromised, then potentially every site and every user of glideinWMS for CMS analysis during the time since the compromise can be affected.Initial ActionsIf a glideinWMS pilot DN is compromised, admins will have to:
Detailed ProceduresThere are two frontend instances running on glidein-frontend.t2.ucsd.edu under user frontend, instance_v5_4 for general usage and instance_o5_4 for xrootd overflow. These procedures could apply to either frontend. Pilot certificates are removed from the configuration file frontend.xml in the CMS frontend, in ~/frontstage/instance_[ov]5_4.cfg in the section under security. For example, there is a list of pilot certificates used:<security> <proxies> <proxy absfname="/home/frontend/.globus/x509_pilot05_cms_prio.proxy" security_class="cmsprio"/> <proxy absfname="/home/frontend/.globus/x509_pilot06_cms_prio.proxy" security_class="cmsprio"/> <proxy absfname="/home/frontend/.globus/x509_pilot07_cms_prio.proxy" security_class="cmsprio"/> <proxy absfname="/home/frontend/.globus/x509_pilot08_cms_prio.proxy" security_class="cmsprio"/> <proxy absfname="/home/frontend/.globus/x509_pilot09_cms_prio.proxy" security_class="cmsprio"/> <proxy absfname="/home/frontend/.globus/x509_pilot10_cms_prio.proxy" security_class="cmsprio"/> </proxies> </security>Remove the compromised proxy from the list and replace it with another that is not being used already in this frontend or in any other running frontend on the machine. Other certificates can be found in ~/.globus. Reconfigure the frontend: ./frontend_startup reconfig ../instance_v5_4.cfg/frontend.xmlhow to kill all pilots with DN=X Collecting Information
Detailed ProceduresGiven the large number of pilots running at any given time O(10000) and the small number of proxies O(10), every site and every user who ran a job in the glideinWMS analysis system since the time of the compromise of a pilot certificate will have been affected. To make this point, look at every site where pilots are currently running using one certificate:letts@submit-4 ~$ condor_status -const '(GLIDEIN_X509_GRIDMAP_DNS=?="/DC=org/DC=doegrids/OU=Services/CN=glidein-collector.t2.ucsd.edu,/DC=org/DC=doegrids/OU=Services/CN=glidein-frontend.t2.ucsd.edu,/DC=org/DC=doegrids/OU=Services/CN=uscmspilot05/glidein-1.t2.ucsd.edu")' -l | grep ^GLIDEIN_CMSSite | sort | uniq -c 20 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T1_CH_CERN" 3 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T1_US_FNAL" 5 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_BE_IIHE" 36 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_BE_UCL" 5 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_BR_SPRACE" 4 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_BR_UERJ" 11 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_CH_CERN" 2 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_CH_CSCS" 39 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_DE_DESY" 6 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_DE_RWTH" 3 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_ES_IFCA" 30 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_FR_GRIF_LLR" 4 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_HU_Budapest" 37 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_IT_Bari" 67 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_IT_Legnaro" 9 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_IT_Pisa" 18 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_RU_JINR" 2 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_UA_KIPT" 8 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_UK_London_Brunel" 7 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_UK_London_IC" 18 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_UK_SGrid_RALPP" 1 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_US_Caltech" 130 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_US_Florida" 13 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_US_MIT" 26 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_US_Nebraska" 3 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_US_Purdue" 41 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_US_UCSD" 26 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T2_US_Wisconsin" 64 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T3_US_Colorado" 50 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T3_US_Omaha" 10 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T3_US_OSU" 1 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T3_US_TTU" 7 GLIDEIN_CMSSite = "T3_US_UMD"This is 33 out of 39 sites running glideins at this time. WRITE HOW TO GET THIS LIST OF SITES, USERS. Other Actions
Action Items
|